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Abstract 
This paper analyses Article 37 (Environmental Protection) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights from the viewpoints of EU law and international 
environmental law. It explores the reasons for the lack of any individually 
justiciable environmental right of a substantive or procedural character under 
the Charter. The paper then investigates the potential of Article 37 to influence 
the interpretation and application of EU law and of other Charter provisions in 
the light of the EU treaty requirement of environmental integration. 
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Article 37, which is found under Title IV ‘Solidarity’ of the Charter, reads: 
 
Environmental Protection 
 
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of 
the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and assured 
in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. 
 
Explanation on Article 37 – Environmental Protection 
 
The principles set out in this Article have been based on Articles 2, 6 and 174 
of the EC Treaty, which have now been replaced by Article 3(3) of the Treaty 
on European Union and Articles 11 and 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. It also draws on the provisions of some national 
constitutions.
1
 
 
 
A. Field of Application of Article 37  
 
Article 37 belongs to the category of ‘principles’ in the Charter, and lays down 
the duties of public authorities in relation to environmental integration in 
policy-making and implementation. It does not, however, sanction any 
individually justiciable right to environmental protection, or to an environment 
of any particular quality. As will be seen, this contrasts with the approach taken 
in many of the national constitutions of the Member States,
2
 which do not only 
place a responsibility on governmental authorities to protect the environment, 
but also recognize an autonomous ‘right to environment’. 3  In omitting any 
reference to environmental rights, Article 37 fails to take a stance on the ‘still 
controversial notion of a [substantive] right to a decent environment’ under 
international environmental law.
4
 Moreover, it falls short of incorporating in the 
Charter environmental rights of a procedural character (i.e. access to 
environmental information, participation in the decision-making concerning the 
environment, and access to justice in environmental matters), which are 
generally recognised under international environmental law.
5
 This lacuna is 
                                               
* The authors are very grateful to Clemens Konrad and Annalisa Savaresi for their excellent 
research assistance. 
1 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17 (Explanatory 
Notes), at 27. 
2 E.g. Spanish Constitution (version 2011) Article 45; see further section C. II below. 
3 A. Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights: A Reassessment?’ (2007) 18 Fordham 
Environmental Law Review 471, at 478-482. 
4  A. Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23(3) European 
Journal of International Law 613, at 616. 
5  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (12 August1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26 vol.1 Annex I (Rio Declaration), Principle 10. 
even more striking given that the realization of these procedural guarantees is 
already an international obligation binding on the Union and its Member States 
under the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
 6
 Short of 
asserting any right related to the environment, we will explore whether Article 
37 may nevertheless influence the interpretation and application of EU law and 
of Charter provisions guaranteeing individual rights.  
 
In light of its cross-cutting, mainstreaming, nature, the field of application of 
the principle of environmental integration enshrined in Article 37 is not, a priori, 
limited to measures adopted in the field of environmental policy,
7
 or any other 
particular area of EU law. Quite to the contrary, the requirement to integrate a 
‘high level of environmental protection’ and ‘the improvement of the quality of 
the environment’ extends, in principle, to all Union policies, both internal and 
external ones. The reference to ‘policies of the Union’ seems to indicate that 
Article 37 applies to, and binds primarily, the Union institutions,
8
 and in 
particular the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament for their 
legislative functions. Yet, Article 52(5) of the Charter clarifies that the 
provisions containing principles, such as Article 37, ‘may be implemented by 
legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies 
of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union 
law, in the exercise of their respective powers.’ Therefore, not only EU 
institutions and other bodies are required to ‘observe’ the principle of 
environmental integration, but also the Member States themselves whenever 
they are implementing EU law. The latter expression may be understood as 
applying to Member States’ measures falling ‘within the scope of’ EU law, 
thereby including measures taken by Member States not only with a view to 
implementing, but arguably also derogating from, Union rules.
9
 
 
It is quite difficult to detail specific instruments of EU law falling within the 
field of application of Article 37,
10
 for two reasons. First, in light of the prolific 
environmental law-making activity of the EU, it has been argued that “there is 
European legislation in almost every conceivable field of environmental 
policy,”11 and indeed EU environmental law covers issues ranging from climate 
change, to biodiversity, water, air pollution, noise, dangerous substances, 
                                               
6 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 (Aarhus Convention), to 
which the EU and almost all of its Member States are parties: see further section D below. 
7 That is, acts adopted pursuant to Articles 191(4) and 192 TFEU (below n 72). 
8 Explanatory Note, at 32: “the Charter applies primarily to the institutions and bodies of the 
Union, in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.” 
9 D. Anderson and C. Murphy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights: History and Prospects in 
Post-Lisbon Europe’ EUI Working Papers LAW 2011/08, at 8, on the basis of Case C-260/89 
Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others (ERT) 
[1991] ECR I-2925, para 43. 
10 A list of EU legislation ‘related’ to Article 37 is nonetheless offered by the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights at: 
http://infoportal.fra.europa.eu/InfoPortal/infobaseShowContent.do?btnCat_413&btnCountryBre
ad_169.  
11 J. Jans and H. Vedder, European Environmental Law (3rd ed, Europa Law Publishing, 2012) 
at 253. 
genetically modified organisms, waste, nuclear safety, as well as horizontal 
measures on environmental assessments, integrated pollution prevention and 
control, integrated product policy and environmental liability.
12
 This means that 
about 70-80% of environmental law implemented in the Member States is of 
EU origin.
13
 Second, several pieces of EU legislation other than environmental 
legislation may be considered as falling within the scope of application of 
Article 37, as they have implemented, to different degrees, the principle of 
environmental integration, with the most prominent examples found in the 
areas of the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, 
transport, energy, and external policies.
14
 Accordingly, the scope of application 
of Article 37 is wide-ranging, if not almost all-encompassing, both at EU and 
Member State level, although, as will be shown, the enforceability of the 
principle faces significant limitations.  
 
 
B. Interrelationship of Article 37 with other provisions of the Charter 
 
While the Charter does not explicitly establish a direct link between Article 37 
and other provisions, some of the Charter rights ‘shall’, and others may, be 
interpreted as including environmental rights. Within the first group, Charter 
rights which correspond to the rights protected under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) must be given the ‘same meaning and scope’ by 
virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter. Among these, the following rights
15
 have 
been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as providing 
indirect protection with regard to environmental matters:
16
 
 Article 2 of the Charter on the right to life corresponds to Article 2 ECHR, 
which has been interpreted as placing a positive obligation on States to 
protect individuals’ life from dangerous activities, such as nuclear tests, the 
operation of chemical factories with toxic emissions or waste-collection 
sites, whether carried out by public authorities themselves or by private 
companies;
17
 
 Article 7 of the Charter on the right to respect for private and family life 
corresponds to Article 8 ECHR, which has been interpreted as giving rise 
to a positive duty for States, under certain circumstances, to protect 
                                               
12 Ibid., Ch 8 for a relatively succinct but incisive overview. 
13  L. Kramer, ‘Regional Economic International Organizations: The European Union as an 
Example’ in D. Bodansky et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 860. 
14 For a succinct overview, see L. Kramer, EU Environmental Law (7th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 
2011), Ch 11; and for a more comprehensive examination, see N. Dhondt, Integration of 
Environmental Protection into Other EC Policies – Legal Theory and Practice (Europa Law 
Publishing, 2003); G. Marín Durán and E. Morgera, Environmental Integration in the EU’s 
External Relations – Beyond Multilateral Dimensions (Hart Publishing, 2012). 
15 Explanatory Notes, at 33-34. 
16 Council of Europe, Manual on Human Rights and the Environment – Principles derived from 
the Case law of the European Court of Human Rights (2nd edition, Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2012). The literature is extensive: for a discussion connected to the purpose of the 
present chapter, see N. de Sadeleer, ‘Enforcing EUCHR Principles and Fundamental Rights in 
Environmental Cases’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 81, at 60-73. 
17 See summary of relevant ECtHR case law in Council of Europe, n 16 above, at 35-41. 
individuals from environmental factors that directly and seriously affect 
their private and family life, or their home;
18
 and 
 Article 17 of the Charter on to the right to property corresponds to Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, which has been interpreted as imposing a 
positive obligation on States to put in place environmental standards 
necessary to protect individuals’ peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.19 
 
In addition, Article 11 of the Charter on freedom of information corresponds to 
Article 10 ECHR,
20
 which has been interpreted as giving rise to a positive 
obligation for public authorities to establish effective and accessible procedures 
that would enable individuals to seek all relevant and appropriate 
environmental information when their right to life, or/and their right to respect 
for private and family life, are threatened.
21
 Article 42, however, is the most 
relevant provision in the Charter in relation to access to environmental 
information, which is based on EU law
22
 – namely Article 15(3) TFEU and 
Regulation 1049/2001 on access to documents.
23
 These norms provide a 
significant level of access to environmental information,
24
 and have been 
complemented by more specific rules under the so-called Aarhus Regulation 
(1367/2006).
25
  
 
While the environmental dimension of the above-mentioned provisions of the 
Charter derives from either other sources in EU law, or the case law of the 
ECtHR, this does not exclude the possibility for other Charter provisions to be 
“greened” when read in conjunction with Article 37. This may be the case of 
                                               
18 See summary of relevant ECtHR case law in Council of Europe, n 16 above, at 44-60. The 
environmental dimension of Article 8 ECHR has been extensively covered by other 
commentaries on Article 37 of the Charter, noting in particular the wide margin of appreciation 
left to public authorities in the Hatton II case (Hatton and Others v UK (2003) Report 2003-
VIII), see e.g., F. Benoît-Rohmer, ‘Article 37 – Protection de l’environnement’ in EU Network 
of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, ‘Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union’ (June 2006), at 316, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/index_en.htm; K. Hectors, ‘The Chartering of 
Environmental Protection: Exploring the Boundaries of Environmental Protection as a Human 
Right’ (2008) 17(3) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 165, at 169-170; M. 
Lombardo, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Environmental Policy Integration 
Principle’ in G. Di Federico (ed.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – From Declaration 
to Binding Instrument (Springer, 2011), at 235-238. It should be noted, however, that the 
ECtHR case law has further evolved on this point, notably in Taşkin and Others v. Turkey, 
46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621 (10 November 2004). For a discussion, see de Sadeleer, n 16 
above, at 64-72. 
19 See summary of relevant ECtHR case law in Council of Europe, n 16 above, at 62-73. 
20 Explanatory Notes, at 21. 
21 See summary of relevant ECtHR case law in Council of Europe, n 16 above, at 76-85. 
22 Explanatory Notes, at 28.  
23 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/43. 
24 M. Lee, EU Environmental Law (Hart Publishing, 2005), at 128-9 and 131-2; Kramer, EU 
Environmental Law, n 14 above, at 137. 
25  Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to 
Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L264/13. 
the right of EU citizens
26
 to refer to the Ombudsman cases of maladministration 
by Union institutions or bodies (Article 43 of the Charter), since the notion of 
maladministration could, for instance, include departures from guidelines and 
procedures to implement environmental integration.
27
 It may well be the case 
also of the right to petition the European Parliament (Article 44 of the Charter), 
which could provide an avenue to enquire about the observance of 
environmental integration principle in the legislative process. 
 
C. Sources of Article 37  
 
As stated in the Explanatory Notes to the Charter, both EU law (Articles 3(3) 
TEU, 11 and 191 TFEU) and some Member States’ constitutions are sources of 
Article 37 of the Charter. It should thus be emphasized that, as opposed to other 
Charter provisions, the drafters of the Charter did not draw inspiration from 
relevant UN treaties, notably the Aarhus Convention in relation to procedural 
environmental rights (discussed below), or the case law of the ECtHR that has 
gradually developed an environmental dimension to certain rights protected 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (discussed above).
28
  
 
 
I. EU Law 
 
At first glance, the wording of Article 37 appears to be a combination of 
Articles 3(3) TEU, which is part of the general provisions setting forth core 
objectives of the Union, 
29
 and 11 TFEU,
30
 which proclaims environmental 
integration as a general principle of EU law. In fact, environmental integration 
was first introduced in EU primary law by the Single European Act of 1986
31
 as 
a principle within the title conferring express competence on environmental 
matters to the then European Economic Community.
32
 It was only with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997
33
 that environmental integration was upgraded to 
a general principle of EU law.
34
 
 
Article 3(3) TEU provides that the EU ‘shall work’, inter alia, for a ‘high level 
of protection and ‘improvement of the quality of the environment’.35 Both of 
these terms have been reiterated in Article 37 as the object of the environmental 
integration principle, but cannot be found in the text of Article 11 TFEU. This 
                                               
26 Or of any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State 
(Art. 228 TFEU; Article 44 Charter). 
27 The argument has been put forward by Marín Durán and Morgera, n 14 above, at 288, and 
was inspired by A. Alemanno, ‘The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan 
Horse within the Commission’s Walls or the Way Forward?’ (2009) 15(3) European Law 
Journal 382, at 388. 
28 See section B above. 
29 Former Article 2 EC Treaty. 
30 Former Article 6 EC Treaty. 
31 Single European Act [1987] OJ L169/1 (SEA). 
32  Title VII ‘Environment’ SEA. For an overview of the emergence and evolution of EU 
competence on environmental matters, see Marín Durán and Morgera, n 14 above, at 9-13. 
33 Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C340/1 (Treaty of Amsterdam). 
34 See Marín Durán and Morgera, n 14 above, at 25-28, for an overview of the emergence and 
evolution of the environmental integration principle. 
35 These terms were added to former Article 2 EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
and other differences can, in fact, be noticed when comparing the language of 
Article 37 with that of Article 11 TFEU, which provides ‘environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view 
to promoting sustainable development’ (emphases added). The inclusion of 
environmental protection in the Charter thus raises a number of interpretative 
questions, when examined against the backdrop of the acquis of the EU 
Treaties: Is Article 37, in essence, just a re-affirmation of Article 11 TFEU, or 
are the textual differences emphasized above of any legal significance?  
 
Finally, the Explanatory Notes also refer to Article 191 TFEU, which is the 
legal basis for EU environmental policy, as a source of Article 37 of the Charter. 
Article 191 TFEU is broadly formulated and allows for including all 
conceivable environmental issues within the remit of EU environmental 
competence. Its first paragraph sets out four objectives for EU action (both 
internal and external) in the field of the environment, namely: ‘preserving, 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment’; ‘protecting human 
health’; ‘ensuring the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources’, and 
‘promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.’ In 
addition, Article 191(2) TFEU lays down a number of principles to guide law-
making and interpretation, namely: high level of environmental protection; 
precaution; prevention; rectification at source; and the polluter pays.
36
 Against 
this background, the interpreter may wonder whether Article 191 TFEU has, in 
fact, served as a source of Article 37 beyond the literal reference to the ‘high 
level of environmental protection.’ All these questions will be addressed in 
section D below. 
 
II. National Constitutional Law 
 
The Explanatory Notes state that Article 37 of the Charter draws inspiration 
from ‘the provisions of some national constitutions’ (emphasis added), with no 
further indication as to the relevant countries. In fact, a brief overview of the 
constitutional texts
37
 reveals a lack of ‘constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States’38 with regard to environmental rights. 
 
In the constitutions of some Member States, environmental protection is 
expressly recognised and protected, not only as a duty of governmental 
authorities, but also as a right (and duty) of the individual. For instance, the 
                                               
36 See also Article 191(3) TFEU, listing a number of criteria that the EU legislator ‘shall take 
into account’ when ‘preparing’ its policy on the environment (e.g. available scientific and 
technical data; environmental conditions in the various regions of the EU; potential benefits and 
costs of action or lack of action). Because of the comparatively weak language of this provision, 
however, such criteria may exert less influence, than the objectives and principles, in 
determining the content of the environmental protection requirements to be integrated pursuant 
to Article 11 TFEU. For a more detailed examination of Article 191 TFEU, see Marín Durán 
and Morgera, n 14 above, at 13-17. 
37 This section is based on the translated texts of the national constitutions provided by the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: 
http://infoportal.fra.europa.eu/InfoPortal/infobaseShowContent.do.  
38 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para 4. 
Spanish Constitution first declares that ‘everyone has the right to enjoy an 
environment suitable for the development of the person, as well as the duty to 
preserve it’.39 It then directs public authorities to ‘watch over a rational use of 
all natural resources with a view to protecting and improving the quality of life 
and preserving and restoring the environment, by relying on an indispensable 
collective solidarity’. 40  Any infringement of these provisions is subject to 
criminal or administrative sanctions, as provided in national law, as well as to 
an obligation to repair the damage caused.
41 A trend towards proclaiming a 
substantive right to environment is also found in the constitutional texts of 
Central European countries, which have acceded to the EU since 2004. For 
instance, the Slovakian Constitution first stipulates that ‘everyone has the right 
to an auspicious environment’,42 and is equally ‘obliged to protect and enhance 
the environment and the cultural heritage’. 43  A procedural right to 
environmental information is also guaranteed,
44
 and the State is generally 
directed to ‘look after an economical use of natural resources, ecological 
balance, and effective environmental care’.45   
 
Short of adopting a right-based formulation, other national constitutions do 
nonetheless recognise environmental protection as a constitutional value and 
obligate the State to protect the environment. For instance, the German 
Constitution declares that ‘mindful also of its responsibility toward future 
generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by 
legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial 
action …’46 Similarly, the Greek Constitution affirms that ‘the protection of the 
natural and cultural environment constitutes a duty of the State’, and as a result, 
it is bound to adopt special preventive or repressive measures for the 
preservation of the environment’.47 Using softer terms, the Dutch Constitution 
also requires the public authorities to concern themselves with ‘keeping the 
country habitable and to protect and improve the environment’. 48  These 
constitutional obligations on the State to protect the environment have been 
                                               
39 Spanish Constitution (as amended in 2011), Article 45(1). 
40 Ibid., Article 45(2).  
41 Ibid., Article 45(3). See also, Article 23(4) of the Belgian Constitution (as amended in 2012) 
on the ‘right to enjoy the protection of a healthy environment’; and Article 20 of the Finnish 
Constitution (as amended in 2011) stating that ‘public authorities shall endeavour to guarantee 
for everyone the right to a healthy environment and for everyone the possibility to influence the 
decisions that concern their own living environment’; Article 66 of the Portuguese Constitution 
(as amended in 2005) stating that ‘Everyone shall possess the right to a healthy and ecologically 
balanced human living environment and the duty to defend it’, and setting out in detail the 
principal responsibilities of the State.  
42 Constitution of the Slovak Republic (as amended in 2004), Article 44(1). See also, Article 53 
of the Estonian Constitution (as amended in 2011); Article 18 of the Hungarian Constitution (as 
amended in 2010); Article 115 of the Latvian Constitution (as amended in 2009); Article 5 of 
the Polish Constitution (1997); Article 72 of the Slovenian Constitution (as amended in 2006).  
43 Constitution of the Slovak Republic (as amended in 2004), Article 44(2). 
44 Ibid., Article 45 reads: ‘Everyone has the right to timely and complete information on the 
state of the environment and the causes and consequences of its condition’. 
45 Ibid., 44(4). 
46 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (as amended in 2010), Article 20(a). 
47 Greek Constitution (as amended in 2008), Article 24(1), spelling out also in more detail the 
principal responsibilities of the States (Article 24(2)-(6)). 
48 Dutch Constitution (as amended in 2002), Article 21. See also Article 2(2) of the Swedish 
Constitution (as amended in 2012).  
considered as equivalent, in fact, to the recognition of an individual right, since 
the concerned persons can ask public authorities to respect it.
49
 
 
Even though there is a number of EU Member States where environmental 
protection is not enshrined in formal constitutional texts, or that lack such a text 
altogether,
50
 the environment may be protected in the national ‘constitutional 
framework’ via other laws51  and/or case-law. 52  To be sure, the presence or 
absence in national constitutions of a right to environment, or/and of a public 
duty to protect it, may be determined by several legal and other factors, and the 
exact implications ultimately depend on how national courts interpret and use 
existing constitutional provisions. Yet, the overview just exposed appears to 
show that the constitutional provisions on environmental protection in most 
Member States are more ambitious, even if only in terms of asserting 
governmental responsibilities, than the letter of Article 37 of the Charter. This 
may be explained by the heightened concern of a minority of Member States 
about ‘avoiding the doubt’ that that the solidarity rights under Title IV of the 
Charter created justiciable rights, such as a right to a healthy environment, 
where such a right was not already provided for under national laws.
53
 
 
D. Analysis 
 
I. General Remarks  
 
As it has already emerged from the review of national constitutions, Article 37 
of the Charter is a clear manifestation of a lack of consensus among the 
Member States on a ‘substantive’ human right to the environment. 54  Such 
disagreement is reflected also at the international level. The EU and its Member 
                                               
49 A. Kiss, ‘Environmental and Consumer Protection’ in S. Peers and A. Ward (eds.), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing, 2004), at 253. 
50 This is notably the case of the common law countries such as the UK. See, Boyle, ‘Human 
Rights or Environmental Rights: A Reassessment?’, n 3 above, at 482. 
51 E.g. French Code on the Environment (as amended in 2012); Articles 7 and 35 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic (as amended in 1999). See further, 
A. Lucarelli, ‘Article 37 – Environmental Protection’ in W.B.T. Wolk (ed.), Human Rights in 
Europe – Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Carolina 
Academic Press, 2010), at 221-222. 
52 The Italian Constitutional Court, for instance, interpreted the right to health that is protected 
by the Italian Constitution as including the right to a healthy environment: Italian Constitutional 
Court judgment n. 5172 of 6 October 1976. In addition, the Italian Constitution has been 
amended so as to include an explicit competence for the State, which is shared with the regions, 
to protect the environment and ecosystems: Article 117 of the Italian Constitution, as amended 
by Constitutional Law No 3/2001. 
53 Article 1(2) of the UK-Poland Protocol; see discussion by Anderson and Murphy, n 9 above, 
at 11-12. 
54  According to C. Coffey, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Place of the 
Environment’ in K. Feus (ed.), The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: Text and 
Commentaries (Federal Trust, 2000), at 132, ‘limited discussion of the possibility of explicitly 
incorporating environmental rights into the EU Treaties’ had occurred during the last 
Intergovernmental Conference leading to the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, on the basis of 
a proposal by the Commission to include a ‘right to a healthy environment, and the duty to 
ensure it’. According to J. Meyer, Kommentar zur Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen 
Union (2nd edition, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2006), para 5, the proposal for an environmental 
provision in the Charter was made ‘relatively late’ in the Convention and the views of the 
members ‘diverged considerably.’ 
States are parties to the Aarhus Convention, which is the only legally-binding 
international agreement that makes reference to a substantive right to a healthy 
environment in an operative provision:  
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of 
present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his 
or her health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of 
access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention.
55
 
 
It follows from the above that the substantive right to a healthy environment is 
only recognized by the Aarhus Convention as a rationale for guaranteeing 
procedural environmental rights, which constitute the core of the Convention.
56
 
In fact, this interpretation was specifically spelt out in the UK Declaration to 
the Aarhus Convention:  
The United Kingdom understands the references in article 1 … to the 
'right' of every person 'to live in an environment adequate to his or her 
health and well-being' to express an aspiration which motivated the 
negotiation of this Convention and which is shared fully by the United 
Kingdom. The legal rights which each Party undertakes to guarantee 
under article 1 are limited to the rights of access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental 
matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
57
 
 
The controversial nature of a substantive right to a healthy environment at these 
various levels may explain its absence from the Charter. What remains less 
clear, however, is the choice of the drafters of the Charter not to incorporate the 
procedural environmental rights that are binding on the EU and its Member 
States as a matter of international law, or at least to those procedural 
environmental rights that have been long protected under the EU law, notably 
the right to access environmental information.
58
 Nonetheless, pursuant to 
Article 53 of the Charter on level of protection,
59
 the procedural environmental 
rights recognized under the Aarhus Convention may not be ‘restricted or 
adversely affected’ by the interpretation of the Charter.  
 
Absent any proclamation of environmental rights in the Charter, the analysis in 
the next sections will first explore what the principle of environmental 
integration means and what its legal significance is in EU law, drawing on 
Article 11 TFEU as the main source of Article 37 of the Charter. The analysis 
will return to the question of the relevance of the Aarhus Convention in the 
discussion of remedies. 
 
II. Specific Provisions 
 
                                               
55 Aarhus Convention, Article 1. 
56 Council of Europe, n 16 above, at 12. 
57 Declaration of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
13&chapter=27&lang=en.  
58 For an overview, see Jans and Vedder, n 11 above, at 368-377. 
59 M. Cartabia, ‘Article 53 – Level of Protection’ in G. Di Federico (ed.), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – From Declaration to Binding Instrument (Springer, 2011).  
The rationale behind the principle of environmental integration first 
promulgated in Article 11 TFEU, and then in Article 37 of the Charter, lies in 
the realisation that progress in the environmental field by itself is not sufficient 
and may be countered by developments in other policy fields that disregard 
environmental protection requirements.
60
 To put this in EU law terms, the very 
essence of the environmental integration principle resides in the fact that Treaty 
provisions other than the environmental legal bases
61
 may be used by the EU 
legislator to adopt measures that may (negatively) affect the environment. In 
broad terms, the environmental integration principle calls therefore for a 
‘continuous greening’ of Union policies. 62  Yet, what does environmental 
integration exactly mean in EU law? And does it have a different meaning 
under Articles 37 of the Charter and 11 TFEU? 
  
As anticipated above, the language of these two provisions differs in a number 
of ways. First of all, the object of Article 37 of the Charter refers to a ‘high 
level of environmental protection’ and to the ‘improvement of the quality of the 
environment’, whereas that of Article 11 TFEU to ‘environmental protection 
requirements’ more broadly. Two interpretative questions arise: what do ‘high 
level of environmental protection’ and ‘improvement of the quality of the 
environment’ mean? And does the differently worded object of environmental 
integration under Article 11 TFEU have any bearing on the interpretation of 
Article 37 of the Charter?  
 
As to the first question, none of the terms is defined in the EU Treaties. The 
expression ‘high level’ of environmental protection is considered ‘one of the 
most important substantive principles of European environmental policy.’63 It is 
in fact reiterated as a principle of EU environmental policy in Article 191 
TFEU, although it is made subject to consideration of the ‘diversity of 
situations in the various regions of the Union’.64 While this expression cannot 
be understood as allowing the EU to adopt the lowest common denominator 
among the Member States’ standards of environmental protection,65 the Court 
of Justice clarified that such a level of protection does not necessarily have to 
be the highest that is technically possible.
66
 Overall, it can be concluded that the 
principle reflects a moving target –the idea of continuous improvement of the 
environmental protection standards across the Member States.67 The expression 
‘improvement of the quality of the environment’ is perhaps easier to interpret as 
implying that any measure leading to environmental degradation runs counter 
the spirit of Article 37 of the Charter.
68
 However, none of these clarifications 
serves to establish what it is exactly that needs to ‘be integrated’ in Union 
policies pursuant to the environmental integration principle. It seems therefore 
                                               
60 J. Holder and M. Lee, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), at 164. 
61 Namely, Articles 191(4) and 192 TFEU (below n 72). 
62 Kramer, EC Environmental Law, n 14 above, at 20. 
63 Jans and Vedder, n 11 above, at 41. 
64 Art 191(2) TFEU; see section C.I. above. 
65 Kramer, EC Environmental Law, n 14 above, at 11-12. 
66 Case C-284/95 Safety High-Tech v S. & T. Srl (Safety High-Tech) [1998] ECR I-4301; see 
Jans and Vedder, n 11 above, at 42. 
67 Kramer, EC Environmental Law, n 14 above, at 12. 
68 Benoît-Rohmer, n 18 above, at 315.  
useful and necessary to rely on the more precise wording of Article 11 TFEU, 
as one of the sources of Article 37, with a view to shedding light on the 
interpretation of the latter. 
 
The substance of the ‘environmental protection requirements’ that are the 
object of the integration obligation in Article 11 TFEU is to be inferred from 
(albeit not explicitly limited to) the objectives and principles of EU 
environmental policy prescribed in Article 191 TFEU.
69
 This indirectly serves 
to clarify also the role of Article 191 TFEU as a source of Article 37 of the 
Charter. Those objectives are framed in very broad terms.
70
 Rather than seeking 
to (unduly) restrict the substantive scope of EU environmental competence, 
Article 191 TFEU leaves the EU legislator a wide margin of appreciation in 
deciding what action and measures, if any, are necessary to achieve the 
environmental objectives stipulated in the Treaty.
71
 The substantive content of 
EU environmental policy is therefore gradually defined by the EU political 
institutions
72
 as they adopt measures in pursuance of the broadly-framed Treaty 
objectives, whether unilaterally or by concluding international agreements. By 
the same token, the broad formulation of Article 191 TFEU supports a non-
restrictive interpretation of the substantive scope of Article 11 TFEU: 
ultimately, it is a matter of political choice which specific environmental issues 
are to be integrated in the ‘Union policies and activities’. 73 In addition, the 
‘environmental integration requirements’ under Article 11 TFEU include the 
environmental principles laid down in Article 191(2) TFEU, which go beyond a 
‘high level of environmental protection’.74  
 
Besides the object of environmental integration, other textual differences may 
be noted between Article 37 of the Charter and 11 TFEU, notably in defining 
the scope of application. Whereas Article 37 succinctly refers to ‘policies of the 
Union’, Article 11 TFEU is more specific, and arguably comprehensive, in 
referring, first, both to the ‘definition’ and ‘implementation’ of Union policies, 
and second, not only to EU ‘policies’ but also its ‘activities.’ As to the latter, it 
could be inferred that the Charter takes a more restrictive approach and 
excludes Union’s activities that are not formally labelled as ‘policies’ of the EU 
in the Treaty.
75
 This would be the case, for instance, of competition rules and 
                                               
69 Jans and Vedder, n 11 above, at 23. 
70 See section C.I. above. 
71 See also Article 192 TFEU, granting the EU legislator a more general power to decide ‘what 
action is to be taken by the Union in order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 191.’ 
72  That is, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, as the adoption of 
measures in this policy field is subject to the ‘ordinary legislative procedure, see Articles 192(1) 
and 294 TFEU. The conclusion of agreements with third countries and international 
organisations based on Article 191(4) TFEU is undertaken in accordance with the general 
procedure laid down in Article 218 TFEU, also involving the three institutions.   
73 Case C-157/96 The Queen and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Commissioners 
of Customs & Excise ex parte National Farmers Union et al (National Farmers Union) [1998] 
ECR I-2211.  
74 See section C.I. above, and, for instance, Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council 
[2002] ECR II-3305, paras 114-115 in relation to the application of the precautionary principle 
to measures adopted to protect human health in the context of the common agricultural policy. 
Note that this is the case that is explicitly referred to in the Explanatory Notes to the Charter, at 
35.  
75 Articles 3-6 TFEU. 
the internal market freedoms. As to the former, Article 11 TFEU encompasses 
both the stages of ‘definition’ (which includes every step of the EU legislative 
processes, such as identification of policy objectives, development of proposals 
and adoption of legislation, as well as their review) and of ‘implementation’ 
(which includes the adoption of further implementing acts and of decisions 
outside the legislative process, and enforcement).
76
  
 
In addition, while both Article 37 of the Charter and Article 11 TFEU contain a 
link to ‘sustainable development’, they seem to differ in approach. Under 
Article 11 TFEU, environmental integration is conceived as a means for the 
realisation of sustainable development as a broader ‘objective’ (i.e. ‘with a view 
to promoting sustainable development’). Conversely, the language of Article 37 
seems to subordinate environmental integration to sustainable development (i.e. 
‘in accordance with’), which appears to be elevated as to the ‘main principle 
and bearer of an outright value’.77 The concept of sustainable development is 
primarily an international construct, and was first conceived in the area of 
international environmental law.
78
 However, sustainable development is not a 
monolithic, well-defined, notion in international law, and arguably even less so 
in EU law. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, sustainable development has been 
part of the ‘raison d’être’ of the EU, given its inclusion among the foundational 
objectives of the Union’s internal and external action as a whole.79 Just as for 
any other objectives, the EU Treaties do not offer a precise definition of 
sustainable development, and the Court has not engaged (thus far) with its 
interpretation. In EU legislation and policy documents, this concept has been 
interpreted flexibly and adapted to different contexts and new developments.
80
  
 
This lack of precise definition renders it difficult to identify the exact 
implications of the link between environmental integration and sustainable 
development in Articles 37 of the Charter and Article 11 TFEU. However, in 
declaring that environmental integration needs to be carried out in respect of the 
principle of sustainable development, Article 37 renders the need for a 
definition of such a principle more pressing.
81
 It should be noted that, the 
‘inflationary use’ of sustainable development by the EU has been criticised as 
putting forward a separate concept from environmental protection, and for the 
lack of systematic attempts to assess whether self-proclaimed sustainable 
development measures comply with environmental protection requirements.
82
 
This has led to concerns over a risk of ‘squeezing out’ environmental protection 
                                               
76 Dhondt, n 14 above, at 45-52.  
77 Lucarelli, n 51 above, at 233. See also de Sadeleer, n 16 above, at 48. 
78  What is traditionally considered the first definition of sustainable development is that 
proposed by the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 
(Oxford University Press, 1987) (Brundtland Report), Ch 2, para 1: ‘development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’. See also, Rio Declaration, particularly Principles 1-3. 
79 Articles 2, 3(3) and (5), and 21(2)(f) TEU. 
80 See Marín Durán and Morgera, n 14 above, at 35-40. 
81 Lucarelli, n 51 above, at 233. 
82  L. Kramer, ‘Sustainable Development in the EC’ in H. Bugge and C. Voigt (eds.), 
Sustainable Development in International and National Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2008), at 
391-393. 
from sustainable development,
83
 to the benefit of the other two pillars (social 
and economic development).
84
 
 
The textual and contextual analysis thus far seems to indicate a more restrictive 
enunciation of the principle of environmental integration under the Charter, 
when compared to the acquis of the EU Treaties. However, a systemic, rather 
than literal, interpretation of Article 37 in light of the broader and more precise 
wording of Article 11 TFEU seems preferable for ensuring a harmonious 
relationship between the Charter and the EU Treaties.
85
 
 
III. Legal Nature 
 
Having established the meaning of environmental integration in EU law, we 
can now turn the legal nature and strength of Article 37. Article 51 of the 
Charter distinguishes between ‘rights’ which the institutions and bodies of the 
Union, or its Member States when implementing EU law, ‘shall respect’, on the 
one hand, and ‘principles’ which they ‘shall observe’, on the other hand. This 
distinction, which is given more precise elaboration in Article 52 of the Charter, 
is of legal significance: while it seems clear that ‘rights’ are justiciable and can 
be invoked by individuals before the courts, the degree of justiciability and 
direct effect of ‘principles’ is not as straightforward. 86  Notwithstanding the 
importance of this distinction, the Charter does not offer a neat catalogue of 
‘rights’ and ‘principles’,87 nor is it always possible to conclusively assert from 
the wording of a particular Charter provision whether it contains a ‘right’ or a 
‘principle’.88 Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Article 37 of the Charter, 
which is the object of our analysis, belongs to the category of ‘principles.’89 It 
articulates a principle of environmental integration, without any further legal 
content in the sense of a ‘fundamental right’. 
 
Article 37 addresses the duties of public authorities in relation to environmental 
protection: that is, to ensure that a ‘high level of environmental protection’ and 
‘the improvement of the quality of the environment’ is integrated into ‘the 
policies of the Union’, ‘in accordance with the principle of sustainable 
development’. Its wording differs strikingly from that of a classical right 
provision: the term ‘right’ itself is omitted, as are similar terms used in other 
                                               
83  See A. Ross-Robertson, ‘Is the Environment Getting Squeezed Out of Sustainable 
Development?’ (2003, Sum) Public Law 249. 
84  The Political Declaration of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc 
A/CONF.199/20 Resolution 1, 4 September 2002 (WSSD Declaration), para 5 recognises: 
‘three interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development: economic 
development, social development and environmental protection’. See further, Marín Durán and 
Morgera, n 14 above, at 41. 
85  R. Schütze, ‘Three “Bills of Rights” for the European Union’ (2011) 30 Yearbook of 
European Law 131, at 146. This would be in line with the spirit of Article 52(2) of the Charter, 
albeit reference is only made to ‘rights’ in that context. 
86 Ibid., at 98. 
87 The Explanatory Notes, at 35, only offer a non-exhaustive list of the principles recognised in 
the Charter, which notably includes Article 37.  
88 Explanatory Notes, at 35 noting that some provisions of the Charter may contain elements of 
both a ‘right’ and a ‘principle’. 
89 The Explanatory Notes on Article 37, at 33, indeed, make reference to the ‘principles set out 
in this Article’. 
Charter provisions that do grant and protect individual rights (e.g. ‘everyone is 
entitled’, 90  ‘no one shall be subjected, held, required’). 91  In addition, the 
provision ‘take[s] care not to specify any beneficiary’ of EU policies, thereby 
avoiding the creation of an ‘individual entitlement guaranteed to the victims of 
pollution.’ 92  Article 37 is thus a declaration of principle, which can be 
interpreted as being of a ‘policy-objective’ nature. 93  As such, it does not 
embody a right that could be enforced by individuals before the Court of Justice 
of the EU (ECJ), or the national courts of the Member States.  
 
Against this background, to what extent does it impose a legal obligation upon 
the EU political institutions to integrate environmental concerns into Union 
policies? Is it intended to be a mere procedural rule requiring the EU legislator 
to consider the environmental dimension of other Union policies, or does it 
demand a substantive integration of environmental concerns?  And how much 
discretion is left to the EU legislator in assessing and balancing environmental 
and other (at times) conflicting policy objectives? 
 
At first sight, there seem to be three views on the legal significance of the 
environmental integration principle. The first, and weakest, interpretation 
would view the principle largely as a procedural tool, imposing a duty to simply 
‘take into account’ environmental concerns in the development of other Union 
policies, while leaving the EU decision-makers with a broad discretion as to 
whether or not to adjust such policies in practice. The second, and stronger, 
interpretation of the principle would, instead, require the EU decision-makers to 
pursue environmental aims in a systematic manner alongside the specific 
sectoral objectives of other Union policies. In other words, it would demand 
substantive integration of environmental objectives into other Union policies, 
without however prescribing a clear precedence of environmental objectives 
over other EU policy objectives. Finally, under the third and strongest 
interpretation, environmental protection requirements would need to be applied 
at all times in priority to other (potentially conflicting) policy objectives.
94
 
 
In our view, the legal significance of the environmental integration principle 
needs to be first inferred on the basis of a close analysis of the wording of 
Article 37 Charter and Article 11 TFEU. Both of these provisions are clearly 
framed in mandatory and justiciable terms: ‘must be integrated’. Furthermore, 
in the EU Treaties, Article 11 TFEU stands out as the only integration clause 
that uses the term ‘must’, as opposed to ‘shall aim at’95 or ‘shall take into 
account’96 which are found in other mainstreaming clauses, and would appear 
                                               
90 E.g., Articles 34(2) and 46 of the Charter. 
91 E.g., Articles 4, 5(1), 49(1), and 50 of the Charter. 
92 de Sadeleer, n 16 above, at 44. 
93 Kiss, n 49 above, at 252; Lucarelli, n 51 above, at 230.  
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to limit more significantly the margin of institutional discretion.
97
 Since its 
early case law on Article 11 TFEU, the Court seems to have interpreted the 
principle as legally binding.
98
 As later noted by Advocate General Jacobs: ‘As 
its wording shows, [Article 11 TFEU] is not merely programmatic: it imposes 
legal obligations’.99  
 
In addition, the terms ‘be integrated’ in both provisions point to a substantive 
legal obligation, rather than a mere policy guideline or procedural rule that 
could be easily satisfied by the EU legislator through a superficial examination 
of the environmental implications of the measure envisaged (e.g. by simply 
taking note of the environment in a preambular recital).
100
 Both provisions 
require that environmental objectives and principles are pursued and applied in 
all Union policies in a systemic manner. That being said, they do not prescribe 
a clear precedence for environmental protection to the detriment of other EU 
policy objectives. This is further corroborated by Article 7 TFEU requiring the 
Union to ensure consistency between all its policies and activities,
101
 as well as 
the lack of a hierarchy between the environmental integration principle and 
other mainstreaming clauses in EU primary law.
102
 Nonetheless, Article 11 
TFEU and Article 37 of the Charter impose a general obligation on the EU 
institutions to carry out, at the very least, an integrated and balanced assessment 
of all the relevant environmental aspects when defining and implementing 
Union policies.
103
   
 
IV. Limitations and Derogations  
 
While it is plain that the environmental integration principle is construed as a 
legal obligation under both Article 37 of the Charter and Article 11 TFEU, it is 
less clear the extent to which these provisions are judicially cognisable and 
                                               
97  Dhondt, n 14 above, at 101–03; E. Psychogiopoulou, The Integration of Cultural 
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be part of Community action on environmental matters merely because it takes account of those 
requirements’ (emphasis added). The Court reiterated this interpretation in Case C-405/92 
Etablissements Armand Mondiet v Société Armement Islais (Mondiet) [1993] ECR I-6133, para 
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103 Jans and Vedder, n 11 above, at 23. 
enforceable. In this regard, Article 52(5) of the Charter states that provisions 
containing principles, such as Article 37, ‘shall be judicially cognisable only in 
the interpretation of [acts that implement them] and in the ruling on their 
legality’. Such a restriction is not placed on ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ referred 
elsewhere in Article 52 of the Charter. If read literally and in isolation, Article 
52(5) of the Charter would seem to impose a significant limitation on the 
justiciability of Article 37: it can only be invoked before a court to challenge 
the legality of an act implementing (i.e. explicitly referring to) the principle of 
environmental integration, but presumably not to aid the interpretation of 
provisions in EU acts that do not do not implement (i.e. make no reference to) 
the principle.  
 
However, the case law on Article 11 TFEU
104
 does not make such a distinction 
and is less restrictive on the justiciability of the environmental integration 
principle. Article 11 TFEU has been relied upon by the Court not only to 
review the legality of EU acts specifically ‘implementing’ environmental 
integration,
105
 but more generally. Given its status of general principle of EU 
law,
106
 Article 11 TFEU is crucial to the interpretation of EU law as a whole, 
both primary and secondary, whether it explicitly or implicitly gives effect to 
the principle of environmental integration.
 107
 That is to say, the ECJ may only 
opt for an interpretation whose effects are positive or neutral on the 
environmental interests involved. An interpretation which does not favour the 
proper integration of environmental protection requirements in EU law or, 
ultimately, their reconciliation with other competing policy goals, is a priori 
inconsistent with Article 11 TFEU, and would need to be justified on the basis 
of Treaty exceptions or other overriding reasons.
108
 A systemic interpretation of 
                                               
104 Note that the relevant case law relates to former Article 6 EC Treaty, and most of it has dealt 
with the role of that provision in the choice of the appropriate legal basis of EU acts, rather than 
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107 Former Article 6 EC Treaty was used as a tool in interpreting Treaty provisions as well as 
secondary law in e.g.: Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-379/98 Preussen-Elektra AG v 
Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, paras 231–32; Joined Cases T-74/00 etc, Artegodan and 
Others v Commission [2002] ECR II-4945, paras 183–84; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-
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Article 37 of the Charter, in light of Article 11 TFEU and its status as general 
principle of EU law, would therefore require a broader justiciability than that 
suggested by the letter of Article 52(5) of the Charter. 
 
It would seem evident, as a consequence, that any piece of EU legislation that 
has a harmful effect on the environment breaches a clear Treaty obligation 
(Article 11 TFEU) and may be subject to annulment by the Court.
109
 However, 
such a breach may be difficult to prove in practice. This is because of the broad 
discretion that is generally left to the EU political institutions in implementing 
and striking a balance between the various policy objectives and principles in 
the Treaties, with the exercise of judicial review usually being restricted to 
verifying that the competent institution did not clearly exceed the bounds of its 
discretion or misuse its powers.
110
 For instance, in disputes over the lawfulness 
of an ozone depletion regulation,
111
 the ECJ confirmed the wide discretionary 
powers of the EU institutions with respect to the Treaty-based environmental 
objectives and principles, and justified it on the need for a margin of 
institutional appreciation in making complex assessments of and balancing 
between these objectives and principles.  
 
It is therefore hard to imagine a situation where the environmental integration 
principle could, in practice, be the successful basis of a legal challenge of a EU 
measure which does not (or not sufficiently) integrate environmental protection 
requirements.
112
 There appear to be no cases in which the Court has accepted 
that a particular piece of EU legislation is invalid just because it fails to take 
proper account of the environmental integration principle. Nor does there 
appear to be any cases where the principle has been relied on in order to 
challenge the validity of national legislation.
113
  
A second limitation to the justiciability of the environmental integration 
principle emerges from the Explanatory Notes on Article 52(5) of the Charter, 
which provide that ‘principles’, unlike rights, in the Charter do not ‘give rise to 
direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member States 
authorities’.114 In other words, Article 37 of the Charter cannot provide the 
basis for challenging a failure to act on the part of the EU institutions.
115
 A 
paradoxical result would ensue: that the EU legislator may be condemned for 
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mis-implementing the principle of environmental integration, but not for failing 
to act upon it altogether. It has been noted, furthermore, that the Charter 
approach in this regard appears stricter than that of the ECJ in relation to the 
enforceability of EU environmental directives, whereby an individual can 
challenge a national agency before a national court for failing to take action 
under the directive.
116
 
 
In essence, actual environmental integration into Union policies is largely a 
matter of legislative and executive discretion, with which the EU judiciary is 
unlikely to interfere. At most, the role of the Court in operationalizing the 
principle lies in its willingness to use it as tool to interpret EU law as a whole. 
 
V. Remedies  
 
Article 47 of the Charter declares the right to an effective remedy and to a fair 
trial in instances where ‘rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the 
Union are violated’. At first sight, the relevance of this provision to Article 37 
of the Charter itself seems rather limited given that, as we have seen, it falls 
short of ‘guaranteeing’ any individual ‘right’ to environmental protection. At 
the same time, as we have also noted,
117
 Article 47 of the Charter must be given 
the ‘same meaning and scope’ than corresponding provisions in the ECHR, in 
this case: Articles 6(1) and 13.
118
 These two provisions have been interpreted 
by the ECtHR as guaranteeing access to justice and an effective remedy in 
environmental matters.
119
 In principle, therefore, EU and national courts should 
apply Article 47 of the Charter in light of this case law. This interpretation is 
further supported by the international obligations related to access to justice in 
environmental matters that bind the EU and its Member States under the 
Aarhus Convention.
120
 
 
In practice, however, access to justice and remedies in environmental matters is 
particularly deficient both at EU and Member State level. At Member State 
level, there is still a significant level of disparity in the national procedures on 
access to courts for environmental matters,
121
 partly due to lack of progress on 
the Commission’s legislative proposal for a Directive implementing the 
provisions in the Aarhus Convention on access to justice in environmental 
matters at the Member State level.
122
 Furthermore, levels of implementation at 
national level remain unsatisfactory with regards to specific provisions on 
                                               
116 de Sadeleer, n 16 above, at 45, relying on Case C-237/07 Janecek [2008] ECR I-06221. 
117 By virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter; see section B above. 
118 Explanatory Notes, at 34 and 29, respectively.  
119 See summary of relevant ECtHR case law in Council of Europe, n 16 above, at 94-109; and 
de Sadeleer, n 16 above, at 63-64. 
120 Aarhus Convention Article 9. 
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2005). 
122 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ COM(2003) 624final, Brussels 24 October 2003. 
access to justice in existing EU environmental law.
123
 The ECJ has, however, 
seized the opportunity to assert that national regulations on access to justice in 
environmental matters need to be interpreted so as to give full effect to the 
standards of the Aarhus Convention and avoid making the exercise of the right 
impossible, or excessively difficult, in practice.
124
  
 
At EU level, on the other hand, the ECJ has ‘obstinately clung to its rigid 
[Plaumann] doctrine’ on standing, and ‘practically barred’ environmental 
NGOs and individuals from bringing cases to EU courts to review the legality 
of EU environmental acts.
125
 The practice has continued after the adoption of 
the Charter, and does not seem to be set to change notwithstanding the 
amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
126
 As a result, the EU has already 
been censured by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Mechanism,
127
 which has 
found that 
…if the [relevant] jurisprudence of the EU Courts on access to 
justice, were to continue, unless fully compensated for by adequate 
administrative review procedures, the [EU] would fail to comply 
with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention (emphasis added).
128
 
  
Against this background, it should be regrettably noted that the scope for 
administrative review of EU acts under the Regulation implementing the 
Aarhus Convention at the level of the EU institutions 
129
 is very narrow and 
applied in an ‘extremely restrictive’ manner. 130  It seems therefore hardly 
capable of ‘fully compensating’ for the lack of access to justice to EU courts.131 
Indeed, the General Court has explicitly affirmed that this provision is ‘not 
compatible’ with the relevant provision of the Aarhus Convention.132 
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Comply with its Obligations?’ (2012) 24(2) Journal of Environmental Law 287, at 289-295; 
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(Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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Article 15. 
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This poor practice in relation to access to justice in environmental matters 
within the EU sheds light on yet another motive behind the unwillingness of the 
drafters of the Charter to proclaim any environmental rights. Without the 
shadow of a doubt, there is a host of compelling legal arguments for the ECJ to 
depart from its (excessively) restrictive approach to standing, notably a 
consistent interpretation of Articles 37 and 47 of the Charter with the Aarhus 
Convention, as well as with the relevant ECtHR case law.
133
 Fears of opening 
the “floodgates” could be kept at bay, as suggested by Pallemaerts, by creating 
a specialized court dealing with environmental issues through an act of the 
European Parliament and the Council.
134
 But political rather than legal 
considerations seem to be preventing this development: the reluctance not only 
of (some) Member States, but also of the ‘EU institutions to be challenged by 
environmental organisations.’135 
 
E. Evaluation 
 
Unlike some of the constitutions of the EU Member States, Article 37 of the 
Charter does not proclaim a substantive right to a healthy environment. In fact, 
Article 37 even fails to codify and elevate to a constitutional level procedural 
environmental rights that are already binding upon the EU and its Member 
States, both under international and EU secondary law. Rather than embodying 
a ‘limit’ on public authorities’ action in order to protect an individual right to 
environmental protection, or a positive obligation to act to fulfil such a right, 
Article 37 articulates a principle of environmental integration as an ‘aim’ for 
public authorities,
136
 thereby simply providing a ‘yardstick against which to 
measure the relative success (or otherwise) of Union/national regulatory 
activities.’137 
 
Against this background, prominent scholars have argued that ‘an exceptional 
occasion has been missed’ to make progress in a field of fundamental 
importance for the life of European citizens, especially in the context of the rule 
of the free market
138
 Indeed, one may question: what is the place of an 
environmental integration principle in a Charter of ‘Fundamental Rights’, and 
indeed its added value to Treaties acquis? Given its status of general principle 
of EU law, Article 11 TFEU already plays, as we have seen, a significant role 
as a source of interpretation of EU primary and secondary law, and at least 
potentially as a basis for reviewing the legality of EU acts. In this regard, 
Article 37 of the Charter adds nothing to Article 11 TFEU, but actually 
attempts to limit the substantive scope and degree of justiciability of the 
                                               
133 Jans and Vedder, n 11 above, at 244; Poncelet, n 123 above, at 302; M. Pallemaerts, ‘Access 
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environmental integration principle.
139
 Does this mean, in essence, that Article 
37 is only of a symbolic value,
140
 a mere reminder to readers of a possible 
environmental dimension of the Charter? Or, as cautiously advanced by AG 
AG Léger, a sign that environmental protection will be accorded ‘increasing 
importance’ in the future?141  
 
Taking an optimist standpoint, one could foresee an added-value in Article 37 
and its inclusion in a Charter of ‘Fundamental Rights’ as a supplementary legal 
argument, and ‘persuasive authority’, 142  for ‘greening’ the practice of EU 
institutions –both political and judicial– vis-à-vis procedural environmental 
rights guaranteed under the Aarhus Convention in the future. This is 
particularly pressing for access to justice in environmental matters at EU level 
which, as we have seen, is not only below ECHR standards,
143
 but has also 
been censured by Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee. Ultimately, if 
the very rationale for ‘constitutionalising’ the Charter was ‘the need for robust 
and accessible judicial protection for individuals against the ever-increasing 
powers of the Union and of the Member States when acting within the scope of 
Union law’, 144  then improved individual access to justice in environmental 
matters is not only urgent from the viewpoint of intensive and ambitious EU 
environmental law internally, but also increasingly desirable in relation to its 
external environmental action.
145
 Possibly the EU’s ambition to lead in the 
global fight against climate change
146
 may bring it to consider the role of 
environmental rights more broadly within its legal system.
147
 
 
From a more pragmatic perspective, judicial references to Article 37 of the 
Charter have been thus far limited in both quantitative and qualitative terms,
148
 
with the notable exception of AG Colomer’s bold statement:  
Environmental protection currently occupies a prominent position among 
Community policies.  Furthermore, the Member States also have a crucial 
responsibility in that area. Community citizens are entitled to demand fulfillment 
of that responsibility under Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
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Climate Change: EU Policy Options (European Parliament, August 2012), 
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148 To the authors’ best knowledge on the basis of research conducted on the website of the ECJ 
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the European Union, which guarantees a high level of environmental protection 
and the improvement of the quality of the environment. Accordingly, the main 
elements of any measure which strays from the general criteria aimed at 
protecting the environment must be duly specified, since that is an embodiment 
of the rational exercise of power, as well as being a tool which, if necessary, 
enables the measure to be reviewed subsequently.
149
 (emphasis added).  
 
However, this seems as of yet an isolated instance, which does not suggest that 
Article 37 is set to acquire increasing importance in the near future.  
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